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Kant *and* Goethe: The connection between sensibility and conceptuality

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In a conversation with his secretary Eckermann April 11, 1827, quoted here from Cassirer (1970, 61), Goethe is recorded as saying "Kant never took any notice of me, although independently I was following a course similar to his. I wrote my *Metamorphosis of Plants* before I knew anything of Kant, and yet it is entirely in the spirit of his ideas." As Cassirer notes this sounds like a curious remark, since Goethe and Kant have usually been depicted as polarities: Kant following Newton and emphasising mathematics as a primary source of knowledge, versus Goethe attacking Newton wanting to divorce any study of nature from the use of mathematics. But as Cassirer also notes, this appears so only when less attention is paid to the importance of Kant's third critique, *Critique of Judgement*, within Goethe's understanding of the Kantian philosophy (ibid., 64). The *Critique of Judgment* (KdU) is significant in its emphasis on the intricate relationship between sensibility and cognition, without downplaying the role of sensibility, which often, and wrongly, is taken to be the case in Kant's previous first critique, *The Critique of Pure Reason* (KdRV), due to what is judged as its cognitive bias and formal epistemological architecture. The supposed common spirit with Kant expressed by Goethe in the quote above, then, is based on evaluating the third critique as endowing sensibility with a central role akin to cognition in providing knowledge about the world. And as we will see in the following, this actually is the case in the first critique as well, though not as explicit as in the third critique.

This might seem like a surprise to a reader of Cornejo's paper (this volume), which aims to reclaim the role of imagination against a highly rationalistic and cognitive psychology, and invoking Goethe *against* Kant in the endeavour,. Our aim here therefore is, *pace* Cornejo, to indicate a more nuanced view of the relationship between Kant and Goethe regarding imagination and its potential meaning for a cultural psychological perspective. Hence, we will underscore the continuity between Kant and Goethe in terms of their overall project, as well as their conceptions of the role of the imagination. We will furthermore stress a modern example of this in Rom Harré's thinking, especially on modelling. This is book-length stuff, one consequence being that our

contribution will deal more with Kant than Goethe, focusing more on the similarities than differences against Cornejo's interpretation.

We will first describe what we take to be Carlos' project and the problem therein. In the light of this problematic a description of Kant's first critique will be made in two rounds. We will first indicate a problem Kant himself encountered writing the first critique, namely trying to provide a more active role for the imagination working within sensibility. Second, this means understanding what Kant terms 'schematism' as the central notion in the first critique. The idea of schematism and its role in mediating between sensibility and cognition is also present in Rom Harré's thinking on modelling. Hence, we will end by making some comments on the relation between Harré and the role of imagination in a modern cultural psychology.

Goethe and Kant, according to Cornejo

Cornejo's effort in directing our attention to the overall problem with a too rationalistic and scientist conceived psychology should be applauded: namely that it tends to exclude psychologically phenomena like fantasy, imagination, emotions, etc., from having significance within a scientific psychological understanding. What we will take issue with here is his understanding of Kant and Goethe as exemplifying, respectively, a too rationalistic versus a more holistic understanding of the role of the imagination, as well as his claim that "We have to overcome Kant" (Cornejo, this volume last page) to counterpoise this rationalistic tendency. But let us move onto Cornejo's interpretation of Kant.

According to Cornejo (this volume, p. 26ff), adopting the Kantian epistemology at the dawn of modern psychology resulted in a number of rationalistic tendencies. One example is the displacement of studies of imagination from psychology to other disciplines, like aesthetics, due to an increasing natural scientific study within psychology focusing on passive natural physiological conditions like perceiving, instead of activities done by the 'creative mind'. Another important tendency occurs because "Kant's epistemological interest is bounded necessarily to the knowledge capacities of the knower. Therefore the Kantian model of reason excludes the realm of feelings, emotions and moods of human being." (ibid., 29) When Kant investigates the conditions for knowledge to come into existence, and these conditions are deemed formal and a priori, then, according to Cornejo, the impact of feelings, emotions and moods become only of a minor importance in the subsequent psychology based on this Kantian heritage. Two background implications exist for this.

First, Kant's thinking was based on a view of the world as ordered in a mechanical way (ibid. 30), with formal methods, predominantly mathematics and exemplified by Newton, providing the best modelling of the human soul. Against this the Romantic Movement revolted, including the young Goethe, emphasising passions, feelings, and creativity as a significant part of the human soul, and not capable of conforming to a pre-given and pure formal conceived rationality.

Second, this mechanical worldview is transferred, so to speak, into Kant's understanding of how the human mind works. Namely, as a predominantly rational mind focusing on the cognitive functions as the most important, denigrating desires and feelings as human psychological capacities. Cornejo (ibid. 21) describes the functioning of the human mind according to Kant, in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, as consisting of three faculties: sensibility, understanding and reason. Sensibility is our capacity to have sensible experiences, and operates actively by ordering the sensible data through the *a priori* forms of time and space. The understanding then brings additional order by subsuming these ordered perceptions, under the conceptual categories (causality, unity etc.) allowing us to perform judgments concerning our perceptions. Reason then has a guiding role in assuring us that a kind of unity prevails when all our judgments come together, that our worldview is harmonious, so to speak. This *transcendental* methodology corresponds to the Copernican revolution claimed by Kant, that "the constitution of the sensible objects depends on the structure of our own faculty of reason, and not the reverse, as was assumed by empiricism and rationalism." (ibid., 21). The transcendental method therefore seeks to understand and bring out what are the *a priori* conditions for our knowledge of the world to be possible.

But what is the role of the imagination, then? Well, according to Cornejo (ibid. 22) "Kant's definition of *imagination* lacks any relation with feelings and organismic processes. For Kant, *imagination* has an intermediary role between sensibility and understanding: it is a force that produces synthesis in the form of sensible experiences, concepts and ideas. It satisfies therefore a function strictly intellectual and its possible grounding in feelings is plainly ignored or conspicuously minimized." Hence, imagination, in both its productive as well as reproductive aspects, is what helps tying the faculties making up the human mind together, making reason possible.

This Kantian psychology, then, expresses for Cornejo (ibid. 23) a model of man as a "*cognizing subject* rather than a person." that is, Kant's focus is on the epistemological subject, an abstract entity endowed with sensibility and reason, and not on *persons*, the concrete empirical entities doing what it is humans do. According to Cornejo, this cleavage between epistemological

subject and person, hence the cognitive bias towards human being, is manifested in Kant's view of the imagination as well, resulting in one of the main differences to Goethe.

Since for Cornejo's Kant, imagination is devoid of any genuine sensuous aspects – its role is *only* to make reason possible – nothing by Kant corresponds to Goethe's *exact sensuous imagination,* capable of leading to what Cornejo terms an *intuitive perception*, or *Anschauung* in German. In contradistinction to Kant, Goethe therefore proceeds not from an abstract subject living at a distance to life, but assumes knowledge, including scientific knowledge, to be personal and based on lived experience, hence involving feelings as well as conceptions (ibid. 6). The aim of achieving knowledge for Goethe, then, is to understand *archetypical phenomena*, (*Urphänomene* in German), that is being able to intuitively perceive, using this exact sensuous imagination, a phenomena in its complete actual and possible development. The primary example is the young Goethe's claim to discover a primordial plant (described in his *Italian Journey*), which is not a cause every plant can be derived from, but more an intuitive picture encompassing the developmental principles functioning in every plant. The primordial plant as *archetypical phenomenon* depicts variations of all plant's structural components, i.e. branches, stems, flowers and roots, thereby exhibiting an endless variety of actual and possible plants, and even some not existing in nature.

For Cornejo perceiving an *archetypical phenomena* is impossible for Kant, because limits to human knowledge exist, and only a divine intellect could possibly 'see' such a phenomena. However, and to start some of our reservations about Cornejo's interpretation, Cassirer (1970, 75ff) has emphasised, and in connection with the primordial plant, that a change occurred in Goethe's understanding of these *archetypical phenomena*. Initially the young and Italy travelling Goethe thought he would be able to actually see and feel the plant with his hands. Returning home, meeting and discussing with Schiller, led Schiller to claim that what Goethe had discovered was not an empirical but an ideal plant, functioning like Kant's ideas of reason (Goethe 1988, 19-20). The more mature Goethe eventually agreed with Schiller's Kantian understanding and claimed in 1830 that the *archetypical phenomena* "must not be interpreted too broadly; if we say it is rich and productive like an ideal, that is the best way to put it." (Quote from Cassirer ibid. 76). The world of experience and the ideal is thus related for Goethe who claimed, "Time is ruled by the swings of the pendulum, the moral and scientific world by the oscillation between idea and experience" (Naturwiss. Schrf. 6, 354, Cassirer 1970, 82), and "The highest wisdom would be to understand that

every fact is already theory." (Maximen und Reflexionen, no. 575) So the cognitive abilities are *also* important for Goethe, and especially the role of the ideal.

According to Cassirer, Goethe therefore accepted Kant's claims about limits to human knowledge, and the *archetypical phenomena* expressed for Goethe "a limit not only to thought, but also to vision." (Cassirer ibid. 83). Hence, the notion of *exact* in *exact sensuous imagination* connotes the concrete exhibiting of the relation between experiences of phenomena *and* ideas and concepts, and not a pure sensuous vision. As Goethe says "Merely looking at a thing can tell us nothing. Each look leads to an inspection, each inspection to a reflection, each reflection to a synthesis; and hence we can say that in every attentive glance at the world we are already theorizing." (Goethe 1988, 159) This sounds similar to Kant's claim that "Thoughts without intuitions are empty, intuitions without thoughts are blind." (KdRV B75). That is, both the possibility of there being objects of experience and experience as such is one and the same possibility. Our *apprehending* of things is equiprimordial (i.e. *ab initio* occurring together as equally fundamental) with our *apperception*, i.e. the empirical and discursive activity of the human mind are assigned to each other, and it is the task of reason to bring out the systematic nature of this relation. Common to both Goethe and Kant then was a view of absolute (divine) theoretical knowledge as being impossible for humans; instead concepts and intuitions come together in human experience and make particular expositions of knowledge possible. To put it as Nassar (2014, 323) does, both Goethe and Kant claimed that "Thinking must become perceptive and perceiving must become thoughtful." As an effort of making sense of the given, then, the possibility that we perceive things is already the possibility that whatever is presented to us is of such a kind that it is possible for us, meaningfully, to understand it using our cognitive capabilities (Brock, 2003, 22)

Now despite our claiming a certain similarity between Kant and Goethe here, this should not overshadow the differences between them. Especially that Kant was a philosopher using a logico-analytical methodology, and Goethe was a poet approaching science in terms of the arts. Hence their respective valuations of sensibility were also different: Kant describing the different relations in human experience necessary for knowledge to obtain, while Goethe was trying to reinforce an identity between thinking, perceiving and the object perceived, the *exact sensuous imagination*. Nevertheless, as already indicated and the following interpretation of Kant will show, this Goethean concept could and should be considered as more in debt to Kant's thinking than Cornejo claims.

To sum up Cornejo's (p. 23) interpretation of Kant, then, a) there cannot be any understanding which is not of a non-discursive nature, b) Kant is more interested in the logico-formal conception of the transcendental categories connected with an abstract epistemological subject, and lastly c) imagination is not connecting sensibility or sensuousness with reason as in Goethe, but "provides images in a reproductive fashion (reproductive imagination) or imprints transcendental categories on sensorial data."

Now Cornejo's interpretation of Kant is actually in line with what he tries to argue against, namely the predominance of a rationalistic understanding of human psychology. As Kukla (2006a) claims, there has been a tendency in the reception of Kant's philosophy, firstly, to downplay the role of third critique in Kant's philosophy. Secondly, too much emphasis has been put on certain parts the transcendental analytic (involving the understanding) while deeming the transcendental aesthetic (involving the sensibility) as well as the role of schematism in bridging sensuousness and reason as irrelevant. Cornejo seems to subscribe, probably unintentionally, to this highly rationalistic understanding of Kant's philosophy because he hardly mentions the third critique, and the role of the schematism, which Heidegger (1929) for example claims is the most important aspect of the first critique, is not touched upon at all.

Not surprisingly, we will next present an interpretation of Kant indicating the importance of the schematism and the transcendental aesthetic, and how this present a picture of the imagination less rationalistic in Conejo's sense and more akin to Goethe's conception. We will, due to lack of space, dwell less on the third critique, but direct the reader's attention to Nassar's (2014, 8ff) analysis claiming that Kant, contrary to Cornejo's view, actually deals with organisms, thought as being both a "cause and effect of itself" (KdU 5: 370) and therefore "both an *organized* and *self-organising* being." (KdU 5: 374) thereby paving the way for our understanding of living beings and our ability to grasp them. Furthermore, as Kant claimed in a letter to Rheinhold, his intention with the third critique was to deal more specifically with the part of our experience revolving around the 'faculty of feeling'. (Guyer 2000, xiv) So feelings are part of Kant's critical project, but touched upon mainly in the third critique and more implicitly, or presupposed as Kant says, in the first critique (KdRV A15/B29).

Another Kant I

If the above interpretation and our initial worries are significant, then more emphasis should be put on apprehending, firstly, as recent commentators on Kant has suggested (Förster

2011; Kukla 2006; Nassar 2014), the place of aesthetics within Kant's critical project and secondly, the role of schematism as the point within Kant's system where sensibility and discursive understanding comes together in an aesthetic sense (Heidegger 1929; Schaper 1964).

Now, it needs to be stressed that the sense in which Cornejo assumes Kant to be rationalistic, has more to do with the sense in which Descartes and Newton were rationalistic. First, only cognitive structures and the discursive understanding matters when it comes to understanding how knowledge is procured, and second, this discursive understanding has a substantial (Descrates's *res cogitans*) character uncovering independent substances (*res extensa*). This is *not* Kant's position, which comes out when one attends more closely to the chapter called the transcendental aesthetics in KdRV (B33, 34/A19, 20)[1]. In here the fundamental category for peoples' relation to the world is described as involving what Kant terms *Gemüt*. This is usually translated as mind, but the etymological connotations of this concept is much broader according to the German digital dictionary, DWDS. It denotes a genuine openness on part of humans to be affected by the world in a sense involving both sensible and cognitive powers (what the dictionary terms *alle seelische kräfte*, all the powers of the soul). Through the *Gemüt* then, we are not uncovering the underlying substances of Descrates, this would be *the thing in itself* by Kant, but only appearances, or phenomena, and the different circumstances in which these phenomena are meaningful to us as sensible and cognitive beings. This is what Kant *presupposed* in the first critique in the chapter on the transcendental aesthetic, the *Gemüt* denoting our basic relation to the world, which is worked out more explicitly in the third critique, as claimed in the end of the last section. We will leave the notion of sensibility in KdRV for now, but will return to it below (in the next section) where we will follow Schaper's suggestion of reading KdRV backwards from the chapter on schematism to the transcendental aesthetics (Schaper 1964).

However, let us briefly return to what Kant's critical project is. Previous thinkers, for example Heidegger (1929), Cassirer (1918), Gerhardt (2002) and Guyer (2005), have all emphasised Kant as not primarily a philosopher of science, but as a thinker trying to understand the diverse aspects of human experience. Correspondingly Kant emphasises the primacy of practical reason compared to theoretical reason. Practical in the sense that investigating the use of and relations between the different faculties is a way of expressing the interest and unity of reason (see Gardner 2006). Hence, his critical project should be seen not as a metaphysics of science, but a

[1] Se also KdU, §75, pp. 270-271 where Kant says "For it is quite certain that we can never adequately come to know the organised beings and their internal possibility in accordance with merely mechanical principles of nature…"

metaphysics of experience, trying to overcome the "twin threats of humiliating scepticism and hubristic dogmatism." (Kukla 2006a, 4) Hubristic dogmatism in the sense of a complacent conventionalism assuming truth is already realised. Humiliating scepticism in the sense that when we have to give up the dream of our total epistemic mastery of the world, as Kant claims, then accepting that we will never understand things as they are in themselves, unconditioned by our own epistemic activities, will not lead to a scepticism of our understanding not being able to grasp and make sense of that world. Kant's project, then, is arguing that despite the fact that our different experiences of the world contain human elements that cannot be eliminated. In other words, these elements (viz. sensible and cognitive) will always help establish the order they encounter, these experiences, and the judgements based upon them, are still directed towards objects in a world not of our making and therefore "answerable for their correctness to the way these objects are." (Manning 2006, 62). *Justifying* this, that our experiences are actually about what they purport to be about, is what culminates in the famous transcendental deduction. This is probably what gives *The Critique of Pure Reason* the rationalistic touch Cornejo builds his interpretation on. Kant, however, encounters the following problem, as Kukla (2006a) has emphasised, internal to his argumentation, which leads to the idea of schematism, as well as a reappraisal of sensibility and the imagination.

Recall that Kant claimed the separation of three faculties, sensibility, understanding and reason, with sensibility initially receiving impressions. Ordering these within the a priori forms of time and space as intuitions was a result of the understanding subsequently reflecting on and determining these intuitions. The understanding effectuates this by categorising what it receives from the sensibility in terms of the concepts it possesses, it subsumes the sensible particulars as intuitions under concepts – I see a particular dog right here and now, and claim "There is a dog". That the impressions received in sensibility have the *a priori* forms of space and time entail, however, that these impressions in addition are conditioned by the cognitive faculty of understanding. So, strictly speaking, Kant ends up here with a dualism of a passive sensibility and active understanding, without being able to actually understand how these are connected in an equal manner. That is, how objects of experience and experience as such are expressions of one and the same possibility.

This forces him to introduce the imagination as that which is capable, at the level of the sensible particular, of performing a pre-discursive synthesis of the manifold. He denotes it a *figurative synthesis*, a kind of intuitive representation of the manifold as combined. As in the example of the dog above, the sensible manifold must be put together in such a way that *different*

dogs must be recognisable even though they, as dogs, also must be subsumable under the general concept dog. However, refusing to grant too much autonomy to a non-discursive capability Kant claims this pre-discursive synthesis, and the work of the imagination, still is "an action of the understanding on sensibility" (B152). So the imagination is here more of a servant of the understanding than a partner, readying the manifold "for understanding's rule *according to the latter's own discursive principles.*" (Kukla 2006a, 10) According to Kukla this poses a problem for Kant, which he recognises at the end of the deduction (A133/B172), and though he doesn't put it exactly his way, his intention can be put as the following: our general rule-like capacity to subsume the sensible manifold under the correct concepts, cannot itself be governed by conceptual rules, because the right application of these rules, then, must be governed by other rules for their right application, and these must afterwards be governed by other rules as well, and so on. This will eventually end in an unacceptable regress (Margolis 2013, Malpas 2003, McDowell 1994).

Hence, Kant needs to accord a more fundamental role to the imagination not as a pure formal and discursive capacity, and here the chapter on schematism in KdRV becomes important. Schematisms cannot be guided by conceptual rules only because their role is to enable the connection of concepts with the sensible manifold, so schematism must be governed in another way, but how?

Another Kant II

First, though, let us consider what a schemata is. Well, a schemata at the time of Kant was something like a plan or a diagram. An architectural plan for constructing a bridge, for example, would stand between a general idea of a bridge and its particular construction. To put it another way, schemata functions like models with a guiding role for understanding the world. According to Schaper (1967, 274f) two points need to be emphasised if we want to understand the role of the schematism in Kant. First, that schemata are exhibited by the productive imagination, and not by either of the faculties, i.e. sensibility, understanding or even reason. Second, that Kant (KdRV, B184) thought of the schemata as time-determinations. Accepting these two points, means settling with the 'orthodox' interpretation of Kant, what Schaper terms 'constructionalism', that the mind imposes some sort of structure on matter, that "structure in every sense is contributed by and derivable from the interest and activity and make-up of the experiencing subject." (ibid., 276). Understood this way, the job of imagination would be moulding the sense-manifold so it can be

submitted to the conceptual apprehension of the understanding, eventually leading to the regress described above.

According to Schaper instead we should think about the relationship between sensibility and understanding as one of mutual entailment, as connected at the outset through the activities of the imagination. She finds textual evidence in *inter alia* KdRV (B181) and (A124), where Kant claims that the schematism is an "art concealed in the depth of the human soul" and that the imagination conditions all knowledge. That is why we must read KdRV backwards, for what Kant initially starts by separating, namely the different faculties, we must know understand as connected from the outset *through the imagination*. For example, Kant claims in KdRV (A124) "The two extremes, namely sensibility and understanding, must stand in a necessary relation to each other…" But is this not just a new form of 'constructionalism'? No, Schaper answers, because as the second point stated above, schemata are time-determinations, entailing that "though it is true that we construct, we construct not as minds, or intellects, not by being mind but by being in time." (1967, 281) So what the chapter on schematisms show us is that human nature is temporal nature. This implies that human nature is not confronting a separate manifold and then structuring it, but is, rather, *already* standing in a relation to this manifold, trough the openness of the *Gemüt*. Remember this is not a passive receptivity but some sort of basic activity involving all human powers. We can now see that this fundamental relation is internal to the world, and that is why the chapter of the schematism leads us back to the notion of aesthetics. The message of the schematism, in Schaper's interpretation, is worth quoting at length: "not that man imposes what he is himself (to a certain extent he obviously does), but that he discovers, via the schemata as underlying the possibility of things for him, his own nature and the nature of that in which he is, his being-in-the-world." (ibid.) To put it in a slightly different way, the schemata are not mirroring the world but expressions of our engaging and arranging the world. Different schemata, then, disclose different aspects of the world. To use the example we started with, different architectural plans for making bridges are ways of arranging the world, and as such provides us with knowledge of the world and our relation to it (that bridges have to be construed differently, in terms of materials, calculations, design etc., according to whether it is for people walking or carrying trains). Different plans of the same bridge can be presented through an ordered sequence in time, plan 1, plan 2 etc. showing a development in our knowledge of this particular bridge as a pattern in space-time. Furthermore, as examples of engaging the world, bridges are signs of the times; they exhibit different interests and experiences in time; e.g., the difference between Tower Bridge in London and the seven-mile bridge in Florida.

What the imagination does then, is that it *exhibits* the amenability of the given to the joint operation of sensibility and understanding from within time. It is the imaginative ability to hold the discerning power of the understanding together with the play of the senses, akin to what Goethe terms *exakte sinnliche Phantasie.* Schematizing is the way the imagination can exhibit the exactness, without this schemata being some sort of involuntary invention, which would be an inexact fantasy, e.g. a daydream, or an inaccurate plan or model incapable of being realised, hence incapable of guiding the human experience and succeeding in this. Remember, Kant claimed "Thoughts without intuitions are empty, intuitions without thoughts are blind." (KdRV B75). Schematas are neither empty nor blind, as expressions of the relationship between sensibility and understanding they are historical and instructive. Blueprints, for example, have developed historically as media for constructing buildings, and have been instructive in different ways as well.

Schematas, then, are the result of the activity of the imagination; they are exhibitions exhibiting different modalities of experience (as relations between sensibility and understanding) as different articulations of human temporality. Schemata therefore "can be seen as the conditions under which men are active and formative in many different ways. The schematic suggestions…provide directions and frames also for non-discursive modes of insight, of social and creative coming to terms with the life we are living and making." (Schaper 1967, 290) Schemata are not restricted to cognitive or even linguistic expressions, then, but are more akin to Cassirer's symbolic forms, the *in media res* of human experience, the media through which sensibility and our conceptual capacities come together in a modal sense (the schemata *actualise* something through the media, e.g. blueprints through traditions of blueprint making, and they make something *possible*, both the construction of a building and the development new blueprint making techniques). One modern example of this understanding of schematas, we will suggest, is Harré's understanding of modelling, as exploring the human umwelt. The plausibility of this comes out of quoting Harré (2004, 104) "As Kant had it and contemporary psychology confirms, our experience is a product of schematic ordering…" This was written in 1981, and revolves around understanding how creativity and imagination is part of science within Harré's working out a realist theory of science (Harré 1986) *and* developing adequate methodologies and theories for the social sciences (e.g. Harré 1990)

Before moving on to Harré, however, let us reiterate briefly. *Pace* Cornejo, we have indicated that Kant's view on imagination is somewhat more complicated than conceiving it as being the hireling of discursivity. The chapter on schematisms show the imagination as more akin to Goethe's exact fantasy, and the schemata as time-determinations opens up a conception of

humans as epistemological subjects, *as well as* subject to historical conditions, i.e. persons engaging in concrete endeavours using symbolic tools according to norms. Furthermore, we have indicated that Goethe and Kant have more in common than what separates them, or at least that it is wrong to conceive their relationship in such antagonistic way as Cornejo and others often do.

One last common thing between Kant and Goethe concerns the notion of idea, cf. Goethe's claim that the primordial plant is an ideal plant. Corresponding to Kant's schematism is Goethe's notion of a morphology (Cassirer 1970, 68) exemplifying a genetic view of nature culminating in the theory of metamorphosis. What ties different forms of plants together, as well as describing their development in both a linear and analogical fashion, is what Kant terms the regulative use of reason. Ideas like the world, god, and the primordial plant are not principles constituting objects of knowledge. Instead they are ideas regulating our work in achieving knowledge by helping us correct errors and reaching a more comprehensive knowledge. The function of an idea is to reach a unity among the diversity of forms/schematisms, an idea is "…a moment, a factor in the process of experience…it is necessary for the use of experience itself, completing it and giving it a systematic unity." (Cassirer 1970, 74f) Implied in being a regulative use is a continuous search in light of changing circumstances, and involving the integrated doing of sensibility and understanding, for a more comprehensive survey of the diverse forms/schematisms, capable of functioning as a provisional ground for further series of integrated doings.

Harré and models

We will end this chapter with an additional indication of how the above interpretation of Kant has implicitly, and some times explicitly, been carried over into the *oeuvre* of Rom Harré. As any reader of Harré will know, his writings are very impressive, encompassing studies covering diverse subjects from chemistry over physics to social psychology, and always with the aim of creating some sort of perspicuous representation of human life as expressed within and through these sciences. Harré's work, and especially Harré (1986; 2004) is furthermore filled with references to schemata, models and the use of imagination. So the idea of modelling occupies a central place particularly as a common denominator for understanding what it is the sciences exploring the human umwelt, i.e. the personal, social and natural world (Harré 1990), actually do.

Three things will end our comment here, first, the move from a first to a second cognitive revolution, namely moving from a Cartesian view on mind as ultimately independent of the world it thinks and feels about, to a view of mind as embedded in contexts and basically related

to it. Second, a short description of some models, or schemata, in natural as well as social sciences, exemplifying a way of bridging our openness to the world through sensibility, emotions, and discursivity. Discursivity for Harré is not related internally to the mind, rather it encompasses public discourses serving as the basis of which persons understand themselves, their social relations, as well as their relation to the natural world. Third, what this shows of the overall thinking about imagination and the use of models/pictures.

Let us first note the similarity between imagination conceived as schematising above, i.e. exhibiting the temporal character of human nature, understood as different cultural forms on the basis of which people understand themselves, each other and the surrounding world, and what Harré (Harré 1992; Harré and Gillett 1994, 18-37) terms the second cognitive revolution. We could describe this as moving from a predominantly internal view of the mind focusing on processes internal to the mind, to an external view focusing on how the mind must be conditioned by external cultural and natural historical factors, to understand what goes on inside our minds.

The first cognitive revolution occurred with the shift within psychology moving from behaviourism to the study of cognition. Here, mental processes were understood as occurring behind peoples' sayings and doings, functioning as a kind of cluster of modules processing information. The metaphor used was the mind as a computer, with cognitive processes being akin to the programme running in the computer. Hence, two processes actually occur, what we do and the mental processes going on behind our actions.

Moving to the second cognitive revolution, according to Harré (1992, 6), took place when certain insights from sociologist and philosophers were incorporated into psychology, arguing against the first revolution. Harré's main examples here are Wittgenstein and Vygotsky, illustrated through two points. First, doing arithmetic calculations on paper and within one's head are autonomous processes. Using the pencil doing these calculations does not involve the occurrence of a similar process of calculation in the mind, only the *practice* of actually doing the calculation matters. Nothing is gained but confusion, by splitting the process into two, one mental and one physical. Second, Wittgenstein warned against making "use of an unjustified and misleading generalization of a grammatical model to explain all the uses of a psychological word." (ibid.) Instead we should become aware of the multiple ways in which psychological concepts are used, like saying "I love you" does not necessarily mean the same thing, psychologically, when said to one's children, one's spouse or one's parents.

The important insight from the second revolution, then, is not that cognitive processes do not occur, but rather that they are immanent to our practices and involves relations to both sensibility and emotions. There are not two different 'things' or 'processes' connecting with each other, they must be connected from the outset to understand what separates them in the first place. Accepting Vygotsky's famous claim that one learns to do privately only what one has learned to do publicly is precisely not creating a mind separate from the practices it participates in. On the contrary, "both private and public cognition are of the same kind, symbolic procedures, according to certain norms" (ibid.). This pertains to emotions as well. Hence, a display of an emotion is not so much a bodily response to a stimulus, as it is a symbolic act embodied in a physiological state. Using the positioning theory associated with Harré, then different positionings come with different, correct or incorrect, displays of emotion. Laughing at a funeral in Denmark would be incorrect as an indecent display of emotion, but laughing might be an acceptable way to display sorrow somewhere else. So, the production of psychological phenomena such as emotions, decisions, attitudes etc. "depends on the skill of the actors, their moral standing in the community, and the story lines that unfold." (Harré and Gillett 1994, 27) To model, according to Harré, then, is to capture these different symbolic procedures and norms guiding the cognitive, sensible and emotional aspects of our relating to the world, other people and our selves. This of course is different within natural and social sciences. Different models apply, but modelling itself, as a way of understanding what goes on in the natural, social and personal world, is part of the schematic ordering of, or modelling, our experience as scientists natural and social.

Implied here is Harré's (1986) three realm theory where different models pertain to these three realms. Briefly put, Realm one consists of the domain of fairly unassisted experience of beings, i.e. everyday objects as well as objects the sciences have helped making visible like protuberances or asteroids. Realm two and three consist of the beings not observed but which either could be observed using new equipments and models, like the electron microscope enabling the visibility of viruses, or as in Realm three, beings which will never be observed, like charges, quantum states or social structures, which we infer to through their observable affordances. All three realms overlap, objects from Realm two can eventually become part of Realm one, for example bacteria, and as a whole, i.e. as the ontological background of scientific inquiry, they amount to the world but as "being used *regulatively.*" (Harré and Krausz 1995, 120). Through the

use of models (like an experiment or using dramaturgy as a model of social interaction[2]) exploring the human *umwelt*, the space available to the human species and human exploratory equipment and only a part of world as a whole, different and related aspects of the three realms are expressed. Inquiries done using optical telescopes and radio telescopes disclose different aspects of the same space, and rely on different models for explaining these aspects. Put together, however, they indicate a more comprehensive understanding of what it is they are modelling.

Two examples will suffice here. The first example used by Harré and Gillett (1994, 62f) concerns why physicist like Maxwell and Bolzmann postulated molecules as significant parts of their model of the constitution of gasses when they weren't observable? The answer was that they framed it within an overall Newtonian theory, and conceived molecules as tiny particles whereby the physicists "helped themselves to the law of Newtonian mechanics as at least part of the cluster of laws that could be used to describe their imagined world of molecules." (Harré and Gillett 1994, 63) Hence, using a model in this sense involves relating what is observed to what is not observed, i.e. *inferring* from the phenomena observed by us to the unobservable processes responsible for, or affording these phenomena. As an act of imagination then, "The model allows us to infer that observed pressure is caused by the impact of the moving molecules, without our needing to observing them!" (ibid.) And as with Goethe, it allows us to infer, using our imagination, to future possible states or models of the constitution of gasses. The second model revolves not around unobservable entities but the interrelations between people and how to model these. Harré (2004, 235-242) uses here one model of conversation as role/rules to capture how people relate to each other and themselves. Rules should here not be thought of as causes of, but rather as guides to action. They help *characterising* people, not as conforming to pre-given rules but by guiding people in writing their own history, as a form of lived narrative whereby people are coming into character. Rules, then, "express norms of intelligible and warrantable conduct. They are not causes of regularities in behaviour." (ibid. 240). The next step is considering the positioning triangle, where one imagines a normative order, within which people allocate to each other a variety of duties, rights and tasks. Here the different social positions, the narratives connected herewith and the rules guiding our behaviour come together. Events within this order are then seen as relating to a narrative in which certain acts - linguistic and non-linguistic - make sense through people positioning themselves and each other within this order. Modelling through this triangle is therefore

[2] Other models would be the positioning theory he helped develop and lately he has been working on the development of a hybrid psychology, combining biological and social sciences as a model for investigating discourse.

modelling a dynamics of change of social interrelations, instead of a fixed social structure. And we should note, there is a projective dimension connected herewith as well. Modelling positions, narratives and concrete acts in connection, is also a way of conceiving what is yet to come. As Rothbart (2004, xi) puts it, "The projective aspect of narratives, and models, is essential for revealing unobserved, but observable events." The force of modelling by social scientist is immense, according to Harré (2004, 111), because by the creative use of imagination, it is possible to "create an icon [a model] whose close simulacrum of a real world is so potent that people will live their lives within its framework, hardly ever suspecting that the framework is no more than a theory for making the messy, unordered flurry of day-to-day life intelligible, and so meaningful and bearable."

Both examples then show us that a model as Harré conceives it, is not a representation of a pre-given structured reality, but a model to reality. Our use of a model is both showing something about the world we are in, and exhibiting our understandings as beings in time, as we are exploring the unobservable realms of molecules as well as actual and projected plans of a future human action. The second cognitive revolution presents us with a way of understanding what this being in time means, namely that discursivity or conceptuality and emotionality are connected to pre-given (historical) symbolic structures of diverse kinds, which guides us in our individual and common thoughts and feelings. And as schemata are models presenting our particular guidance, as involving particular relations between discursivity and sensibility, models by Harré tries to capture how we develop practices dealing meaningfully with observable as well as unobservable natural processes, and the dynamics of social relations within the human life as a whole. What we have tried to indicate here, then, is that Kant might be of more relevance than Cornejo thinks, and not just as a historical precursor, but one who is seriously engaged with by authors informing cultural psychology like Cassirer or Harré.

Conclusion

So we have argued against Cornejo's view of Kant, trying to describe how the relationship between Kant and Goethe is much closer than usually understood, especially when we pay attention to the completed character of Kant's entire work and the role of the imagination within Kant's aim of providing a metaphysics of experience. Addressing the imagination and connecting this with the schematism, we ended up with features similar to Goethe's concept of an *exakte sinnliche Phantasie*. Bringing this idea up to a modern psychological understanding, we pointed towards Rom Harre´s notion of modelling and its connection with what Harré terms a second cognitive

revolution. The first cognitive revolution pictured the mind's activities as some sort of information processing, modelled on a computer with a highly discursive and rationalistic programme running. Cornejo's interpretation of Kant comes close to this, depicting the understanding (*Verstand* by Kant) as the "central processing unit", reacting to the separate surrounding world. Instead separating human beings with their cognitive processes from the world surrounding them, the second cognitive revolution, in the spirit of Wittgenstein and Vygotsky, claims that what goes on in the mind of somebody must have been a matter of what one has learned publicly in the first place. Hence, there is a plain connection between private and public cognition, which is exhibited in many different historical ways through language, signs, gestures, norms etc. and in many different fields like art, law, religion etc. To study this, in a cultural psychology, is to study all sorts of symbolic manipulations and formations as Harré claims, and his way of using models and comparisons between these, is a modern way of understanding what Kant's schematisms and Goethe's exact sensible fantasy is all about.

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